| dc.creator |
Ehlers, Lars |
|
| dc.creator |
Klaus, Bettina |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T07:57:45Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T07:57:45Z |
|
| dc.date |
2002-12-09 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:02Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:02Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1859 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1859 |
|
| dc.description |
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. |
|
| dc.description |
L. Ehlers gratefully acknowledges financial support from the SSHRC (Canada). B. Klaus's research was partly supported by a Ramón y Cajal contract and Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
554.02 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Acyclical priority structuresss |
|
| dc.subject |
Deferred acceptance algorithm |
|
| dc.subject |
Indivisible objects |
|
| dc.subject |
Priority rules |
|
| dc.title |
Efficient Priority Rules |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|