Voting by Committees with Exit

dc.creator	Berga, Dolors
dc.creator	Bergantiños, Gustavo
dc.creator	Massó, Jordi
dc.creator	Neme, Alejandro
dc.date	2007-11-06T07:52:28Z
dc.date	2007-11-06T07:52:28Z
dc.date	2002-05-15
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:02Z
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:02Z
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1856
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1856
dc.description	We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
dc.language	eng
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation	511.02
dc.rights	openAccess
dc.subject	Strategy-proofness
dc.subject	Stability
dc.subject	Voting
dc.subject	Committees
dc.title	Voting by Committees with Exit
dc.type	Documento de trabajo

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