Preventive health care and payment systems to providers

dc.creator	Pita Barros, Pedro
dc.creator	Martínez-Giralt, Xavier
dc.date	2007-11-06T07:46:02Z
dc.date	2007-11-06T07:46:02Z
dc.date	2002-03-25
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:02Z
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:02Z
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1852
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1852
dc.description	Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.
dc.language	eng
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation	507.02
dc.rights	openAccess
dc.subject	Preventive health care
dc.subject	Payment systems to providers
dc.title	Preventive health care and payment systems to providers
dc.type	Documento de trabajo

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