| dc.creator |
Pita Barros, Pedro |
|
| dc.creator |
Martínez-Giralt, Xavier |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T07:46:02Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-06T07:46:02Z |
|
| dc.date |
2002-03-25 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:02Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:02Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1852 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1852 |
|
| dc.description |
Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
507.02 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Preventive health care |
|
| dc.subject |
Payment systems to providers |
|
| dc.title |
Preventive health care and payment systems to providers |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|