أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Martínez, Ruth
dc.creator Massó, Jordi
dc.creator Neme, Alejandro
dc.creator Oviedo, Jorge
dc.date 2007-11-05T14:42:12Z
dc.date 2007-11-05T14:42:12Z
dc.date 2003-05-16
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:58:01Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:58:01Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1846
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1846
dc.description For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
dc.description The work of R. Martínez, A. Neme, and J. Oviedo is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina). The work of J. Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-2130 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica (Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology) and 2001SGR-00162 from the Departament d’Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació (Generalitat de Catalunya).
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 577.03
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Matching
dc.subject Stability
dc.subject Strategy-proofness
dc.title On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
dc.type Documento de trabajo


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط