For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.The work of R. Martínez, A. Neme, and J. Oviedo is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina). The work of J. Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-2130 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica (Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology) and 2001SGR-00162 from the Departament d’Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació (Generalitat de Catalunya).