| dc.creator |
Casari, Marco |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T14:39:03Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T14:39:03Z |
|
| dc.date |
2003-03-29 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:01Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:01Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1843 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1843 |
|
| dc.description |
In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
583.03 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Bounded rationality |
|
| dc.subject |
Genetic algorithms |
|
| dc.subject |
Individual heterogeneity |
|
| dc.title |
Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|