| dc.creator |
Massó, Jordi |
|
| dc.creator |
Neme, Alejandro |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T12:56:36Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T12:56:36Z |
|
| dc.date |
2003-05-07 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:58:00Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:58:00Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1834 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1834 |
|
| dc.description |
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules. |
|
| dc.description |
The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, and 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya. |
|
| dc.description |
Peer reviewed |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
571.03 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Bribe-proofness |
|
| dc.subject |
Strategy-proofness |
|
| dc.subject |
Efficiency |
|
| dc.subject |
Replacement Monotonicity |
|
| dc.subject |
Single-peakedness |
|
| dc.title |
Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|