| dc.creator |
Brandts, Jordi |
|
| dc.creator |
Cooper, David J. |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T11:29:32Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T11:29:32Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004-03-02 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:57:56Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:57:56Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1804 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1804 |
|
| dc.description |
Trabajo publicado como artículo en American Economic Review 96(3): 669- 693 (2006).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.669 |
|
| dc.description |
Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the
organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory
experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such
performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs
depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by
employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative
to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient
outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design
then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level.
We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but,
surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subjects have
coordinated on a higher effort level, reductions in the financial incentives to coordinate have
little effect on behavior. Hence, a “shock therapy” of temporary increases in incentives to
coordinate can lead to permanent improvements in an organization’s performance. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
606.04 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Incentives |
|
| dc.subject |
Coordination |
|
| dc.subject |
Experiments |
|
| dc.subject |
Organizations |
|
| dc.title |
A Change Would Do You Good . . . An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|