Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities

dc.creator	Veszteg, Róbert Ferenc
dc.date	2007-11-05T11:10:47Z
dc.date	2007-11-05T11:10:47Z
dc.date	2004-02-15
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:57:53Z
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:57:53Z
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1796
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1796
dc.description	I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.
dc.language	eng
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation	613.04
dc.rights	openAccess
dc.subject	Aspiration function
dc.subject	Envy-free social choice function
dc.subject	Fairness, implementation
dc.subject	Indivisible goods
dc.title	Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities
dc.type	Documento de trabajo

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