| dc.creator |
Casari, Marco |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T10:59:08Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T10:59:08Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004-06-01 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:57:53Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:57:53Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1794 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1794 |
|
| dc.description |
We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it confounds the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
615.04 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Sanctions |
|
| dc.subject |
Public goods |
|
| dc.subject |
Cooperation |
|
| dc.subject |
Experiments |
|
| dc.title |
On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|