| dc.creator |
Vorsatz, Marc |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T10:35:19Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-11-05T10:35:19Z |
|
| dc.date |
2004-08-09 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:57:52Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:57:52Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1792 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1792 |
|
| dc.description |
In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof. |
|
| dc.description |
This research was undertaken with support from the fellowship 2001FI-00451 of the Generalitat de Catalunya and from the research grant BEC2002-02130 of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología of Spain. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
617.04 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Approval Voting |
|
| dc.subject |
Borda Count |
|
| dc.subject |
Dichotomous Preferences |
|
| dc.subject |
Social Choice Function |
|
| dc.title |
Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|