أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Vorsatz, Marc
dc.date 2007-11-05T10:29:12Z
dc.date 2007-11-05T10:29:12Z
dc.date 2004-09-07
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:57:52Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:57:52Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1790
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1790
dc.description The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.
dc.description This research was undertaken with support from the fellowship 2001FI-00451 of the Generalitat de Catalunya and from the research grant BEC2002-02130 of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología of Spain.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 619.04
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Approval Voting
dc.subject Dichotomous Preferences
dc.subject Social Choice Function
dc.subject Social Welfare Function
dc.title Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط