Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism

dc.creator	Pérez-Castrillo, David
dc.creator	Veszteg, Róbert Ferenc
dc.date	2007-10-31T12:26:15Z
dc.date	2007-10-31T12:26:15Z
dc.date	2005-01-10
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:57:50Z
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:57:50Z
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1768
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1768
dc.description	Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.
dc.language	eng
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation	638.05
dc.rights	openAccess
dc.subject	Experiments
dc.subject	Mechanisms
dc.subject	Uncertainty
dc.title	Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism
dc.type	Documento de trabajo

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