أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Chioveanu, Ioana
dc.date 2007-10-31T12:25:35Z
dc.date 2007-10-31T12:25:35Z
dc.date 2005-01-28
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:57:50Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:57:50Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1767
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1767
dc.description This paper is based on my PhD dissertation (Ch. 2) written under the supervision of Xavier Vives.
dc.description I construct a model in which an oligopoly first invests in persuasive advertising in order to induce brand loyalty to consumers who would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative on the market, and then competes in prices. Despite ex-ante symmetry, at equilibrium, there is one firm which chooses a lower advertising level, while the remaining ones choose the same higher advertising. For the endogenous profile of advertising expenditure, there are a family of pricing equilibria with at least two firms randomizing on prices. The setting offers a way of modelling homogenous product markets where persuasive advertising creates subjective product differentiation and changes the nature of subsequent price competition. The pricing stage of the model can be regarded as a variant of the Model of Sales by Varian (1980) and the two stage game as a way to endogenize consumers heterogeneity raising a robustness question to Varian’s symmetric setting.
dc.description Peer reviewed
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 639.05
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Oligopoly
dc.subject Advertising
dc.subject Price dispersion
dc.subject Brand loyalty
dc.title Advertising, Brand Loyalty and Pricing
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط