| dc.creator |
Brandts, Jordi |
|
| dc.creator |
Cooper, David J. |
|
| dc.date |
2007-10-31T12:14:39Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-10-31T12:14:39Z |
|
| dc.date |
2005-02-18 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:57:49Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:57:49Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1761 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1761 |
|
| dc.description |
We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well. |
|
| dc.description |
The authors thank the NSF (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (SEC2002-01352), the BBVA Foundation, and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA for financial help. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
643.05 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Change |
|
| dc.subject |
Incentives |
|
| dc.subject |
Coordination |
|
| dc.subject |
Communication |
|
| dc.subject |
Experiments |
|
| dc.subject |
Organizations |
|
| dc.title |
It's What You Say Not What You Pay |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|