أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Brandts, Jordi
dc.creator Cooper, David J.
dc.date 2007-10-31T12:14:39Z
dc.date 2007-10-31T12:14:39Z
dc.date 2005-02-18
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:57:49Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:57:49Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1761
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1761
dc.description We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.
dc.description The authors thank the NSF (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (SEC2002-01352), the BBVA Foundation, and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA for financial help.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 643.05
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Change
dc.subject Incentives
dc.subject Coordination
dc.subject Communication
dc.subject Experiments
dc.subject Organizations
dc.title It's What You Say Not What You Pay
dc.type Documento de trabajo


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط