أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط
| dc.creator |
Beviá, Carmen |
|
| dc.creator |
Llavador, Humberto |
|
| dc.date |
2007-10-31T08:46:59Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-10-31T08:46:59Z |
|
| dc.date |
2006-04-28 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:57:48Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:57:48Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1744 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1744 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage with-out recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are
many reasons for high reelection rates diferent from incumbency status, we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideological and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the
literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
662.06 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Incumbency |
|
| dc.subject |
Information |
|
| dc.subject |
Candidate quality |
|
| dc.subject |
Selection bias |
|
| dc.subject |
Ideology |
|
| dc.title |
The Informational Value of Incumbency |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|
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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط