أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Bervoets, Sebastian
dc.creator Merlin, Vincent
dc.date 2007-10-30T15:57:58Z
dc.date 2007-10-30T15:57:58Z
dc.date 2006-09-24
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:57:47Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:57:47Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1729
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1729
dc.description This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdiction?s voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 669.06
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Gerrymandering
dc.subject Manipulation
dc.subject Two-tiers voting systems
dc.title Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط