DSpace Repository

Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

Show simple item record

dc.creator Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc
dc.creator Iehlé, Vincent
dc.date 2007-10-30T15:22:57Z
dc.date 2007-10-30T15:22:57Z
dc.date 2007-01-22
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:57:46Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:57:46Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1722
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1722
dc.description We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.
dc.description Peer reviewed
dc.language eng
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.relation 678.07
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Balancedness
dc.subject Cooperative Games
dc.subject Core
dc.subject Parametrized games
dc.title Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)
dc.type Documento de trabajo


Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account