| dc.creator |
Flores Fillol, Ricardo |
|
| dc.date |
2007-10-30T14:58:01Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-10-30T14:58:01Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-03 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:57:46Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:57:46Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1717 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1717 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations. |
|
| dc.description |
I acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (SEC2002-02506 and BEC2003-01132) and Generalitat de Catalunya (2005SGR00836). |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
683.07 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Fully-connected networks |
|
| dc.subject |
Hub-and-spoke networks |
|
| dc.subject |
Brand loyalty |
|
| dc.subject |
Fully-served markets |
|
| dc.subject |
Partially-served markets |
|
| dc.title |
Airline Competition and Network Structure |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|