أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط
| dc.creator |
Macho-Stadler, Inés |
|
| dc.date |
2007-10-30T13:22:50Z |
|
| dc.date |
2007-10-30T13:22:50Z |
|
| dc.date |
2006-11-20 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2017-01-31T00:57:44Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2017-01-31T00:57:44Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1706 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1706 |
|
| dc.description |
Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
UFAE and IAE Working Papers |
|
| dc.relation |
673.06 |
|
| dc.rights |
openAccess |
|
| dc.subject |
Environmental regulation |
|
| dc.subject |
Audits and compliance |
|
| dc.subject |
Environmental standards |
|
| dc.title |
Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance |
|
| dc.type |
Documento de trabajo |
|
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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط