أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Massó, Jordi
dc.creator Nicolò, Antonio
dc.date 2007-10-29T17:35:47Z
dc.date 2007-10-29T17:35:47Z
dc.date 2007-10-15
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-31T00:57:39Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-31T00:57:39Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1684
dc.identifier.uri http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1684
dc.description We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
dc.description The work of Massó is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science through grant SEJ2005-01481/ECON and FEDER and through project CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016), and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2005-00454 and through the Barcelona Economics Program (XREA). The work of Nicolò is partially supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research through grant 2005137858.
dc.language eng
dc.relation 714.07
dc.relation UFAE and IAE Working Papers
dc.rights openAccess
dc.subject Public goods
dc.subject Gregarious Preferences
dc.subject Subgame Perfect Implementation
dc.title Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences
dc.type Documento de trabajo


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط