When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/7403

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	de Figueiredo, John	-
dc.creator	Kim, James	-
dc.date	2004-12-10T19:16:36Z	-
dc.date	2004-12-10T19:16:36Z	-
dc.date	2004-12-10T19:16:36Z	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-09T02:39:49Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-09T02:39:49Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-09	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7403	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721	-
dc.description	This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC.	-
dc.format	206718 bytes	-
dc.format	application/pdf	-
dc.language	en_US	-
dc.relation	MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4483-04	-
dc.subject	Lobbying	-
dc.subject	Transaction Cost Economics,	-
dc.subject	Appropriability	-
dc.subject	Telecommunications	-
dc.title	When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission	-
dc.type	Working Paper	-
Appears in Collections:	MIT Items

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