The Price of Anarchy Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/5136

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Perakis, Georgia	-
dc.date	2004-05-28T19:24:47Z	-
dc.date	2004-05-28T19:24:47Z	-
dc.date	2003-12	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-09T02:37:55Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-09T02:37:55Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-09	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/5136	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721	-
dc.description	In this paper we characterize the "price of anarchy", i.e., the inefficiency between user and system optimal solutions, when costs are non-separable, asymmetric and nonlinear, generalizing earlier work that has addressed "price of anarchy" under separable costs. The generalization models traffice equilibria, competitive multi-period pricing and competitive supply chains. The bounds established in the paper are tight and explicitly account for the degeee of asymmetry and nonlinearity of the cost function. We introduce and alternate proof method for providing bounds that uses ideas from semidenfinite optimization. Finally, in the context of nulti-period pricing our analysis establishes that user and system optimal soulutions coincide.	-
dc.format	295539 bytes	-
dc.format	application/pdf	-
dc.language	en	-
dc.publisher	Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Operations Research Center	-
dc.relation	;OR 367-03	-
dc.subject	System and User-Optimization,	-
dc.subject	Traffic Equilibrium,	-
dc.subject	Price of Anarchy.	-
dc.title	The Price of Anarchy Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs	-
dc.type	Working Paper	-
Appears in Collections:	MIT Items

Files in This Item:

There are no files associated with this item.

DSpace JSPUI