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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/4049Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Xue, Yanfeng | - |
| dc.date | 2004-02-13T19:27:21Z | - |
| dc.date | 2004-02-13T19:27:21Z | - |
| dc.date | 2004-02-13T19:27:21Z | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-09T02:33:59Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-09T02:33:59Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-09 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4049 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721 | - |
| dc.description | Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions. These two approaches are usually labeled as "make" and "buy" strategies. In this paper, I examine the relation between a firm's choice of "make" or "buy" and the performance measures used in the firm's CEO compensation contract. I focus on the two major differences between "make" and "buy" strategies: the risk levels and accounting treatments. I then examine the differential implications of accounting-based and stock-based performance measures on managers' incentive in choosing between the two strategies. Using data from US high tech industries, I find that, firms relying on "buy" approach to obtain technology tend to depend more on the accounting-based performance measures, while those firms who innovate through R&D activities skew toward stock-based pay especially stock options | - |
| dc.format | 194036 bytes | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4436-03 | - |
| dc.subject | R&D | - |
| dc.subject | Acquisition | - |
| dc.subject | Compensation | - |
| dc.subject | Technology | - |
| dc.title | Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation | - |
| dc.type | Working Paper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items | |
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