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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/4046| Title: | Financing Decisions When Managers Are Risk Averse |
| Keywords: | Executive Compensation Stock Options Risk Incentives Leverage |
| Issue Date: | 9-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | This paper studies the impact of financing decisions on risk-averse managers. Leverage raises stock volatility, driving a wedge between the cost of debt to shareholders and the cost to undiversified, risk-averse managers. I quantify these "volatility costs" of debt and examine their impact on financing decisions. The paper finds: (1) the volatility costs of debt can be large, particularly if the CEO owns in-the-money options; (2) higher option ownership tends to increase, not decrease, the volatility costs of debt; (3) a stock price increase typically reduces managerial preference for leverage, consistent with prior evidence on security issues. Empirically, I estimate the volatility costs of debt for a large sample of U.S. firms and test whether these costs affect financing decisions. I find evidence that volatility costs affect both the level of and short-term changes in debt. Further, a probit model of security issues suggests that managerial preferences help explain a firm's choice between debt and equity |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4046 |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items |
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