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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/4045| Title: | Board Independence, Executive Pay Structures, and Pay Disclosure: Evidence from Europe |
| Keywords: | Board Independence Compensation Structures Pay Disclosure International Corporate Governance |
| Issue Date: | 9-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | Using a broad sample of the largest European companies, I examine whether the two governance mechanisms, namely (i) independent monitoring by a board of directors and (ii) grants and disclosures of incentive-based executive pay, are substitutes for one another. I find that companies with proportionately more executives on their boards of directors grant greater incentive-based pay to their executives, and improve the transparency of their pay disclosure. The findings are consistent with the efficient contracting argument, which predicts that greater incentive-based pay and pay disclosure transparency mitigate agency problems generated by boards dependent upon management |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4045 |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items |
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