Board Independence, Executive Pay Structures, and Pay Disclosure: Evidence from Europe

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/4045

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Muslu, Volkan	-
dc.date	2004-02-06T19:31:36Z	-
dc.date	2004-02-06T19:31:36Z	-
dc.date	2004-02-06T19:31:36Z	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-09T02:33:59Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-09T02:33:59Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-09	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4045	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721	-
dc.description	Using a broad sample of the largest European companies, I examine whether the two governance mechanisms, namely (i) independent monitoring by a board of directors and (ii) grants and disclosures of incentive-based executive pay, are substitutes for one another. I find that companies with proportionately more executives on their boards of directors grant greater incentive-based pay to their executives, and improve the transparency of their pay disclosure. The findings are consistent with the efficient contracting argument, which predicts that greater incentive-based pay and pay disclosure transparency mitigate agency problems generated by boards dependent upon management	-
dc.format	282406 bytes	-
dc.format	application/pdf	-
dc.language	en_US	-
dc.relation	MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4432-03	-
dc.subject	Board Independence	-
dc.subject	Compensation Structures	-
dc.subject	Pay Disclosure	-
dc.subject	International Corporate Governance	-
dc.title	Board Independence, Executive Pay Structures, and Pay Disclosure: Evidence from Europe	-
dc.type	Working Paper	-
Appears in Collections:	MIT Items

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