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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/1856Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Gallien, Jérémie | - |
| dc.date | 2003-04-14T20:33:40Z | - |
| dc.date | 2003-04-14T20:33:40Z | - |
| dc.date | 2003-04-14T20:33:40Z | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-05-31T20:33:56Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-05-31T20:33:56Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-06-01 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1856 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721 | - |
| dc.description | Motivated by electronic commerce, this paper is a mechanism design study for sellers of multiple identical items. In the market environment we consider, participants are risk neutral and time-sensitive, with the same discount factor; potential buyers have unit demand and arrive sequentially according to a renewal process; and valuations are drawn independently from the same regular distribution. From the Revelation Principle, we can restrict our attention to direct dynamic mechanisms taking a sequence of valuations and arrival epochs as a strategic input. We define two properties (discreteness and stability), and prove that under a regularity assumption on the inter-arrival time distribution, we may at no cost of generality consider only mechanisms satisfying them. This effectively reduces the mechanism input to a sequence of valuations, allowing us to formulate the problem as a dynamic program (DP). Because this DP is equivalent to a well-known infinite horizon asset-selling problem, we can finally characterize the optimal mechanism as a sequence of posted prices increasing with each sale. Our numerical study indicates that, with uniform valuations, the benefit of dynamic pricing over a fixed posted price may be small. Besides, posted prices are preferable to online auctions for a large number of items or high interest rate, but in other cases auctions are close to optimal and significantly more robust | - |
| dc.format | 330328 bytes | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4268-02 | - |
| dc.subject | Dynamic Pricing | - |
| dc.subject | Fixed Posted Price | - |
| dc.subject | Online Auctions | - |
| dc.title | Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce | - |
| dc.type | Working Paper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items | |
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