Governance of Adjustments

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/1836

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Wernerfelt, Birger	-
dc.date	2003-03-14T19:02:32Z	-
dc.date	2003-03-14T19:02:32Z	-
dc.date	2003-03-14T19:02:32Z	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-05-31T20:23:55Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-05-31T20:23:55Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-06-01	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1836	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721	-
dc.description	The article proposes a research program to compare game forms in terms of their ability to govern ex post adjustments to ex ante contracts. The comparisons can be based on direct implementation-costs or the extent to which desirable adjustments are not implemented. In several examples of the program, we compare three game forms: Negotiation over each adjustment, ex ante price lists, and implicit contracts leaving the stipulation of adjustments to one player. If the latter game form is defined as an employment relationship, the theory of the firm becomes a special case of the program. The article starts with a discussion of the nature and magnitude of adjustment-costs, followed by an exposition of four examples. We then discuss the role of asset ownership, review some empirical evidence, and look at broader implications.	-
dc.format	226315 bytes	-
dc.format	application/pdf	-
dc.language	en_US	-
dc.relation	MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4412-03	-
dc.subject	Theory of the Firm	-
dc.subject	Employment Relationship	-
dc.subject	Contracts	-
dc.title	Governance of Adjustments	-
dc.type	Working Paper	-
Appears in Collections:	MIT Items

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