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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | McAdams, David | - |
| dc.date | 2002-08-16T15:45:21Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-08-16T15:45:21Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-08-16T15:45:30Z | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-05-31T18:47:06Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-05-31T18:47:06Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-06-01 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1598 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721 | - |
| dc.description | In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) non-decreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private. | - |
| dc.format | 346785 bytes | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4254-02 | - |
| dc.subject | Equilibrium | - |
| dc.subject | Auctions | - |
| dc.title | Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions | - |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items | |
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