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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/1568Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | McAdams, David | - |
| dc.date | 2002-08-09T19:08:05Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-08-09T19:08:05Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-08-09T19:08:20Z | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-05-31T18:32:04Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-05-31T18:32:04Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-06-01 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1568 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721 | - |
| dc.description | An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which (1) each player i's action set is a finite sublattice of multi-dimensional Euclidean space, (2) types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two "non-primitive conditions" whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (3) single-crossing in own action and type and (4) quasisupermodularity in own action. Similarly, given that (134) and (2') types are multi-dimensional (with atoms) an isotone mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Conditions (34) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types, and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies (a) supermodularity in own action and (b) non-decreasing differences in own action and type. These results also extend to games with a continuum action space when each player's ex post payoff is also continuous in his and others' actions. | - |
| dc.format | 347053 bytes | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4248-02 | - |
| dc.subject | Equilibrium | - |
| dc.subject | Isotone | - |
| dc.title | Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information | - |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items | |
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