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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/1568| Title: | Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information |
| Keywords: | Equilibrium Isotone |
| Issue Date: | 1-Jun-2013 |
| Description: | An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which (1) each player i's action set is a finite sublattice of multi-dimensional Euclidean space, (2) types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two "non-primitive conditions" whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (3) single-crossing in own action and type and (4) quasisupermodularity in own action. Similarly, given that (134) and (2') types are multi-dimensional (with atoms) an isotone mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Conditions (34) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types, and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies (a) supermodularity in own action and (b) non-decreasing differences in own action and type. These results also extend to games with a continuum action space when each player's ex post payoff is also continuous in his and others' actions. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1568 |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items |
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