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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/1721.1/1481Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Correa, Hector | - |
| dc.creator | Weiss, Martin | - |
| dc.creator | Shin, Seung-Jae | - |
| dc.date | 2002-07-22T15:31:26Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-07-22T15:31:26Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-07-22T15:31:27Z | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-05-31T17:39:54Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-05-31T17:39:54Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-06-01 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1481 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721 | - |
| dc.description | In this paper, we study the local dial-up Internet access market using a game theoretic model. In particular, we consider the Nash equilibrium of the service providers and examine their behavior on investment and output level. We calibrate this model to fit the industry structure and data found in rural markets. In the first part of the paper, we examine the Internet industry structure and its characteristics. In the latter part of the paper, we create an abstract Cournot duopoly model, in which real world cost and revenue projection will be used to find an Internet access market equilibrium and its social welfare. These analyses allow us to explain the motivation for the ISPs' behavior, such as over-subscription and under-investment. Finally, we will present an analytical framework for the Internet industry policy maker. | - |
| dc.format | 256396 bytes | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | ITS;14 | - |
| dc.subject | service providers | - |
| dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | - |
| dc.subject | Internet access market | - |
| dc.subject | output level | - |
| dc.subject | game theoretic model | - |
| dc.subject | dial-up Internet | - |
| dc.subject | input level | - |
| dc.subject | investment | - |
| dc.title | A Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis for Internet Access Market | - |
| Appears in Collections: | MIT Items | |
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