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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/885| Title: | Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure |
| Keywords: | L22 L12 L4 ddc:330 incomplete contracts vertical integration monopolization Vertikale Konzentration Unvollständiger Vertrag Einzelhandel Sortiment Wettbewerbstheorie Wirtschaftliche Effizienz Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel |
| Description: | In this paper we consider the impact of vertical integration on a retailer's choices of product variety and specific, brand-supporting investment. In an incomplete contract environment, vertical merger encourages investment in integrated supply, and foreclosure of non-integrated manufacturers. Anti-competitive as opposed to efficiency interpretations depend delicately on a trade-off between the benefits of supplier-specific rather than generally applicable retailer investment, and the value of multi-product rather than single product retailing. Where retailers compete, it is shown that vertical integration implements competition reducing, product differentiating investment strategies. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/885 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/885 ppn:198051816 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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