Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/885
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dc.creatorBickenbach, Frank-
dc.creatorWilliams, Iestyn-
dc.date1996-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T06:09:49Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T06:09:49Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/885-
dc.identifierppn:198051816-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/885-
dc.descriptionIn this paper we consider the impact of vertical integration on a retailer's choices of product variety and specific, brand-supporting investment. In an incomplete contract environment, vertical merger encourages investment in integrated supply, and foreclosure of non-integrated manufacturers. Anti-competitive as opposed to efficiency interpretations depend delicately on a trade-off between the benefits of supplier-specific rather than generally applicable retailer investment, and the value of multi-product rather than single product retailing. Where retailers compete, it is shown that vertical integration implements competition reducing, product differentiating investment strategies.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel-
dc.relationKiel Working Papers 734-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectL22-
dc.subjectL12-
dc.subjectL4-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectincomplete contracts-
dc.subjectvertical integration-
dc.subjectmonopolization-
dc.subjectVertikale Konzentration-
dc.subjectUnvollständiger Vertrag-
dc.subjectEinzelhandel-
dc.subjectSortiment-
dc.subjectWettbewerbstheorie-
dc.subjectWirtschaftliche Effizienz-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleInvestment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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