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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/4066Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Neugebauer, Tibor | - |
| dc.creator | Perote, Javier | - |
| dc.creator | Schmidt, Ulrich | - |
| dc.creator | Loos, Malte | - |
| dc.date | 2007 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:09:45Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:09:45Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4066 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:543700062 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/4066 | - |
| dc.description | In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel | - |
| dc.relation | Kieler Arbeitspapiere 1376 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | C72 | - |
| dc.subject | C92 | - |
| dc.subject | H41 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Experimental economics | - |
| dc.subject | Information feedback | - |
| dc.subject | Public goods | - |
| dc.subject | Voluntary contributions | - |
| dc.subject | Conditional cooperation | - |
| dc.subject | Öffentliches Gut | - |
| dc.subject | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | - |
| dc.subject | Wiederholte Spiele | - |
| dc.subject | Eigeninteresse | - |
| dc.subject | Experiment | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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