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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2596| Title: | The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection |
| Keywords: | G34 K22 K42 ddc:330 labor markets employment protection corporatism corporate governance shareholder protection political economy Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung Korporatismus Public Choice Arbeitsrecht Aktienrecht Corporate Governance Insider-Outsider-Modell Schätzung Theorie Welt |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | CESifo GmbH München |
| Description: | This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more devided the workface is, and the more globalized capital markets are, the more likely is a capitalist politicoeconomic equilibrium with little employment and substantial investor protection. Our prediction of a negative cross-country relationship between labor market rigidities and of competition on capital markets receives considerable empicical support. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2596 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596 ppn:751418943 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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