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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2596Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Fehn, Rainer | - |
| dc.creator | Meier, Carsten-Patrick | - |
| dc.date | 2001 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:20:08Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:20:08Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:751418943 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2596 | - |
| dc.description | This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more devided the workface is, and the more globalized capital markets are, the more likely is a capitalist politicoeconomic equilibrium with little employment and substantial investor protection. Our prediction of a negative cross-country relationship between labor market rigidities and of competition on capital markets receives considerable empicical support. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | CESifo GmbH München | - |
| dc.relation | CESifo working paper series 456 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | G34 | - |
| dc.subject | K22 | - |
| dc.subject | K42 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | labor markets | - |
| dc.subject | employment protection | - |
| dc.subject | corporatism | - |
| dc.subject | corporate governance | - |
| dc.subject | shareholder protection | - |
| dc.subject | political economy | - |
| dc.subject | Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung | - |
| dc.subject | Korporatismus | - |
| dc.subject | Public Choice | - |
| dc.subject | Arbeitsrecht | - |
| dc.subject | Aktienrecht | - |
| dc.subject | Corporate Governance | - |
| dc.subject | Insider-Outsider-Modell | - |
| dc.subject | Schätzung | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.subject | Welt | - |
| dc.title | The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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