Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2284
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dc.creatorBoss, Alfred-
dc.date1999-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T06:28:26Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T06:28:26Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/2284-
dc.identifierppn:300528353-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2284-
dc.descriptionSickness benefit ineome reduces an employee's opportunity costs of absence from work. In the Federal Republic of Germany the institutional arrangement was changed several times during the 1951-1998 period. This paper investigates the effects on sick leave behavior. According to the empirical analysis, moral hazard is a serious problem in Germany. The paper discusses some institutional changes which would significantly reduce moral hazard.-
dc.languagedeu-
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel-
dc.relationKiel Working Papers 935-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectI18-
dc.subjectI38-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectLohnfortzahlung-
dc.subjectErwerbsunfähigkeit-
dc.subjectFehlzeit-
dc.subjectMoral Hazard-
dc.subjectPrivate Krankenversicherung-
dc.subjectDeutschland-
dc.titleLohnfortzahlung und Krankenstand-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
Appears in Collections:EconStor

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