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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2244| Title: | Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz |
| Keywords: | C71 C78 D82 H54 K12 P20 P30 ddc:330 Wohnungspolitik Wohnungsbaufinanzierung Privatisierung Unvollständiger Vertrag Transaktionskosten Anreizvertrag Verhandlungstheorie Neue Bundesländer |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel |
| Description: | Governments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental) and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt compromise in east German housing, it results that a sophisticated design of contractual incompleteness may provide a reasonable safeguard against opportunistic behaviour. Yet it involves considerable costs and still does not guarantee that policy goals are achieved. The crucial policy question is if contracts can be drafted without creating a one-sided holdup potential or if governments should not co-operate with market agents but commit to policy rules. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2244 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2244 ppn:268012466 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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