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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19894Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Hakenes, Hendrik | - |
| dc.creator | Schnabel, Isabel | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:07:22Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:07:22Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19894 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:477634664 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19894 | - |
| dc.description | The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously leads to higher risk-taking at those banks that do not enjoy a bail-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition in the deposit market and depressing other banks? margins. In contrast, the effects on the protected bank?s risk-taking and on welfare depend on the transparency of the banking sector. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004/12 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | L11 | - |
| dc.subject | G28 | - |
| dc.subject | G21 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Government bail-out | - |
| dc.subject | banking competition | - |
| dc.subject | transparency | - |
| dc.subject | "too big to fail" | - |
| dc.subject | financial stability | - |
| dc.subject | Bankrisiko | - |
| dc.subject | Bank | - |
| dc.subject | Risikofreude | - |
| dc.subject | Unternehmenssanierung | - |
| dc.subject | Einlagensicherung | - |
| dc.subject | Wettbewerb | - |
| dc.subject | Bankenkrise | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Banks without Parachutes : Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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