Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19347
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dc.creatorGale, Douglas-
dc.creatorVives, Xavier-
dc.date2002-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:04:15Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:04:15Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19347-
dc.identifierppn:346910994-
dc.identifierRePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26195-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19347-
dc.descriptionCentral bank policy suffers from time-inconsistency when facing a banking crisis : A bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard. Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so. Dollarization is good when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high, monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns, and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate. However, a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization Undesirable. The results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the IMF as International LOLR.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationHWWA Discussion Paper 185-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectWährungssubstitution-
dc.subjectUS-Dollar-
dc.subjectGeldpolitik-
dc.subjectBank-
dc.subjectKleines-offenes-Land-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleDollarization, bailouts, and the stability of the banking system-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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