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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19270
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dc.creatorHefeker, Carsten-
dc.date2004-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:03:59Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:03:59Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19270-
dc.identifierppn:47241304X-
dc.identifierRePEc:zbw:hwwadp:298-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19270-
dc.descriptionThe paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationHWWA Discussion Paper 298-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectF34-
dc.subjectF33-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectdebt crisis-
dc.subjectcurrency crisis-
dc.subjectexchange rate regime-
dc.subjectFinanzmarktkrise-
dc.subjectAuslandsverschuldung-
dc.subjectZahlungsunfähigkeit-
dc.subjectWechselkurssystem-
dc.subjectPublic Choice-
dc.subjectWährungskrise-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleDefault, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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