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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19162Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Sadiraj, Vjollca | - |
| dc.creator | Tuinstra, Jan | - |
| dc.creator | van Winden, Frans | - |
| dc.date | 2006 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:03:18Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:03:18Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19162 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:510039421 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19162 | - |
| dc.description | Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1698 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | D72 | - |
| dc.subject | D71 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | spatial voting models | - |
| dc.subject | electoral competition | - |
| dc.subject | winning set | - |
| dc.subject | interest groups | - |
| dc.subject | Abstimmungsregel | - |
| dc.subject | Interessenvertretung | - |
| dc.subject | Wahlkampf | - |
| dc.subject | Räumliche Interaktion | - |
| dc.subject | Public Choice | - |
| dc.subject | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | - |
| dc.title | On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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