Optimal central bank design : benchmarks for the ECB

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19161

Title:	Optimal central bank design : benchmarks for the ECB
Keywords:	E58 D72 ddc:330 central bank design federal central banks ECB Eurosystem ECB reform Zentralbank Vorstand Organisation Benchmarking Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion EU-Staaten USA Deutschland
Issue Date:	16-Oct-2013
Publisher:
Description:	The paper discusses key elements of optimal central bank design and applies its findings to the Eurosystem. A particular focus is on the size of monetary policy committees, the degree of centralization, and the representation of relative economic size in the voting rights of regional (or sectoral) interests. Broad benchmarks for the optimal design of monetary policy committees are derived, combining relevant theoretical arguments with available empirical evidence. A new indicator compares the mismatch of relative regional economic size and voting rights in the monetary policy committees of the US Fed, the pre-1999 German Bundesbank, and the ECB over time. Based on these benchmarks, there seems to be room to improve the organization of the ECB Governing Board and current plans for reform.
URI:	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19161
Other Identifiers:	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19161 ppn:51003926X
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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