Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19133| Title: | Long persuasion games |
| Keywords: | D82 C72 ddc:330 cheap talk communication diconvexification dimartingale disclosure of certifiable information jointly controlled lotteries Nichtkooperatives Spiel Kommunikation Asymmetrische Information Dynamisches Spiel Nash-Gleichgewicht Theorie cheap talk |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19133 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19133 ppn:510020690 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.