Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19130

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Goerke, Laszlo	-
dc.date	2006	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:03:05Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:03:05Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19130	-
dc.identifier	ppn:51002002X	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19130	-
dc.description	Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a nonsystematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1666	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	D73	-
dc.subject	H26	-
dc.subject	H25	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	corruption	-
dc.subject	firms	-
dc.subject	tax evasion	-
dc.subject	Korruption	-
dc.subject	Unternehmensbesteuerung	-
dc.subject	Steuervermeidung	-
dc.subject	Steuerkriminalität	-
dc.subject	Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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