Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19096
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dc.creatorCigno, Alessandro-
dc.date2005-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:02:51Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:02:51Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19096-
dc.identifierppn:509897843-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19096-
dc.descriptionThe paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationCESifo working papers 1632-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectJ1-
dc.subjectI2-
dc.subjectH5-
dc.subjectH31-
dc.subjectD7-
dc.subjectD91-
dc.subjectD82-
dc.subjectH2-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectintergenerational cooperation-
dc.subjectfamily-
dc.subjectfertility-
dc.subjectsaving-
dc.subjectprivate transfers-
dc.subjecteducation-
dc.subjectchild benefits-
dc.subjectpensions-
dc.subjectself-enforcing constitutions-
dc.subjectGenerationenbeziehungen-
dc.subjectKooperation-
dc.subjectPublic Choice-
dc.subjectVerfassungsökonomik-
dc.subjectAlterssicherung-
dc.subjectFamilienleistungsausgleich-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleThe political economy of intergenerational cooperation-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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