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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19093Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Falch, Torberg | - |
| dc.creator | Str?m, Bjarne | - |
| dc.date | 2005 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:02:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:02:51Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19093 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:509894321 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19093 | - |
| dc.description | This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1629 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | H72 | - |
| dc.subject | D73 | - |
| dc.subject | J45 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | public sector labor market | - |
| dc.subject | wage bargaining | - |
| dc.subject | political strength | - |
| dc.subject | budgetary process | - |
| dc.subject | Besoldung | - |
| dc.subject | Lohnverhandlungstheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Public Choice | - |
| dc.subject | Macht | - |
| dc.subject | Kommunalverwaltung | - |
| dc.subject | Schätzung | - |
| dc.subject | Norwegen | - |
| dc.title | Wage bargaining and political strength in the public sector | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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