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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19092| Title: | Do institutions of direct democracy tame the leviathan? : Swiss evidence on the structure of expenditure for public education |
| Keywords: | I22 H41 H72 ddc:330 direct democracy median voter bureaucracy public education Demokratie Median Voter Schule Schulfinanzierung Bürokratietheorie Public Choice Schätzung Schweiz |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | The deleterious impact of institutions of direct legislation on student performance found in studies for both the U.S. and Switzerland has raised the question of what its transmission channels are. For the U.S., an increase in the ratio of administrative to instructional spending and larger class sizes were observed, supporting the hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school administration. For Switzerland, using a cross-sectional time-series panel of sub-federal school expenditure and size of classes, no such effect is detected. This finding is in line with previous analyses in which efficiency gains in the provision of public goods for Switzerland have been found. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19092 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19092 ppn:509893465 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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